A lire absolument. Document sur la Grèce, que l’on soit européiste ou eurosceptique

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Beyond the Greek Impasse

Geopolitical Weekly JUNE 30, 2015 Par George Friedman

George Friedman founded Stratfor in 1996 with a pioneer’s vision for bringing open-source intelligence analysis to the private market. Today Stratfor is a leading global intelligence and consulting firm that provides geopolitical analysis and forecasting to individuals and organizations around the world.

The Greek situation — having perhaps outlived the term « crisis, » now that it has taken so long to unfold — appears to have finally reached its terminal point. This is, of course, an illusion: It has been at its terminal point for a long time.

La situation grecque semble en phase terminale. C’est une illusion, le point terminal a été atteint il y a longtemps.

The terminal point is the juncture where neither the Greeks nor the Germans can make any more concessions. In Greece itself, the terminal point is long past. Unemployment is at 26 percent, and more than 50 percent of youths under 25 are unemployed. Slashed wages, particularly in the state sector, affecting professions including physicians and engineers, have led to massive underemployment.

Ni les grecs ni les Allemands ne peuvent aller plus loin dans les concessions , le chômage est devenu trop important en Grèce.

Meanwhile, most new economic activity is occurring in the untaxable illegal markets. The Greeks owe money to EU institutions and the International Monetary Fund, all of which acquired bad Greek debts from banks that initially lent funds to Greece in order to stabilize its banking sector. No one ever really thought the Greeks could pay back these loans.

L’économie grecque est devenue souterraine. L’argent des Institutions, de la Troika a servi à rembourser les banques et à stabiliser les banques européennes. Personne n’a jamais pu croire que les Grecs pourraient rembourser leurs dettes.

The European creditors — specifically, the Germans, who have really been the ones controlling European negotiations with the Greeks — reached their own terminal point more recently. The Germans are powerful but fragile. They export about a quarter of their gross domestic product to the European free trade zone, and anything that threatens this trade threatens Germany’s economy and social stability. Their goal has been to keep intact not only the euro, but also the free trade zone and Brussels’ power over the European economy.

Les Allemands ne peuvent aller plus loin, leur pouvoir est réel, mais fragile. Ils ont besoin d’exporter le quart de leur production vers la zone euro, et tout cela menace leur stabilité interne. Les Allemands veulent maintenir l’euro intact, protéger leur zone de libre-échange et surtout les pouvoirs de Bruxelles sur l’économie européenne.

Germany has so far avoided an extreme crisis point by coming to an endless series of agreements with Greece that the Greeks couldn’t keep and that no one expected them to keep, but which allowed Berlin to claim that the Greeks were capitulating to German demands for austerity. This alleged capitulation helped Germany keep other indebted European countries in line, as financially vulnerable nations witnessed the apparent folly of contemplating default, demanding debt restructuring and confronting rather than accommodating the European Union.

L’Allemagne a évité la crise extrême en imposant à la Grèce des accords dont tout le monde savait qu’ils ne pouvaient être respectés, mais qui validaient la stratégie Allemande d’imposer l’austérité. Grace à cette stratégie l’Allemagne a réussi à contrôler les autres pays d’Europe, car ces pays fragiles se sont rendu compte de la folie qu’il y avait à refuser d’obéir à l’Union Européenne. La Grèce à servi d’exemple ou plutôt de contre-exemple.

For the Germans, Greece represented a dam. What was behind the dam was unknown, and the Germans couldn’t tolerate the risk of it breaking. A Greek default would come with capital controls such as those seen in Cyprus, probably trade barriers designed to protect the Greek economy, and a radical reorientation of Greece in a new strategic direction. If that didn’t lead to economic and social catastrophe, then other European countries might also choose to exercise the Greek option.

La Grèce représentait une digue et on ne savait pas ce qu’il y avait derrière cette digue. La Grèce aurait pu se réorienter autrement, et si cela n’avait pas abouti au chaos, alors les autres pays européens auraient pu être tentés de suivre son exemple.

Germany’s first choice to avoid the default was to create the illusion of Greek compliance. Its second option was to demonstrate the painful consequences of Greece’s refusal to keep playing the first game.

L’Allemagne a fait semblant, pendant longtemps, pour éviter le défaut Grec, de croire que la Grèce remplissait les conditions exigées. La seconde option pour les Allemands était de donner à voir les conséquences terribles qui en découlaient si les Grecs ne jouaient pas le jeu.

This was the point of the Cyprus affair. Cyprus had reached the point that it simply could not live up to the terms of its debt repayment agreements. The pro-EU government agreed under pressure to seize money in bank accounts holding more than 100,000 euros (around $112,000) and use that money to make good on at least some of the payments due. But assigning a minimum account balance hardly served to lessen the blow or insulate ordinary Cypriots. A retiree, after all, may easily have more than 100,000 euros in savings. And hotels or energy service companies (which are critical to the Cypriot economy) certainly have that much in their accounts.

Les Allemands se sont servis de Chypre. Mais tout ce qu’ils ont réussi, c’est à précipiter le pays dans le chaos. Le gouvernement Cypriote était pro-Euro, il a obéi et cela a été un désastre.

The Germans may have claimed the Cypriot banking system contained primarily Russian money, but — although it undoubtedly contained plenty of Russian funds — most of the money in the system actually represented wealth saved and used by Cypriots in the course of their lives and business. The result of raiding those accounts was chaos. Cypriot companies couldn’t pay wages or rent, and the economy basically froze until the regulations were eventually eased — though they have never been fully repealed.

Le résultat a été le gel de l’économie Cypriote .

The Germans were walking a fine line in advocating this solution. Rather than play the pretend game they had played in Greece, they chose to show a European audience the consequences of genuine default.

Les Allemands  ont voulu montrer publiquement les conséquences d’un défaut et faire peur. L’expérience s’est retourné contre eux et les peuples européens ont compris que les responsables étaient leurs leaders politiques dès lors qu’ils obéissaient aux Allemands. Et ils en ont tiré la conclusion que le fait d’obéir ne garantissait rien de bien et que mieux valait préférer l’autre branche de l’alternative, c’est à dire se doter de leaders non obéissants, non complaisants.

But those consequences rested on a dubious political foundation. Obviously the Cypriot public was devastated and appalled by their political leaders’ decision to comply with Germany’s demands. But even more significant, the message received by the rest of Europe was that the consequences of resistance would be catastrophic only if a country’s political leadership capitulated to EU demands. Seizing a large portion of Cypriot private assets to pay public debts set an example, but not the example the Germans wanted. It showed that compliance with debt repayments could be disastrous in the short run, but only if the indebted country’s politicians let it happen. And with that came another, unambiguous lesson: The punishment for non-compliance, however painful, was also survivable — and far preferable to the alternatives.

La punition pour désobéir était douloureuse, mais elle était finalement préférable. D’où la montée de Syriza et celle des autres partis eurosceptiques ces dernières années .

Enter the Coalition of the Radical Left party, known as Syriza, one of the numerous Euroskeptic parties that have emerged in recent years. Many forces combined to drive pro-EU factions out of power, but certainly one of them was the memory of the behavior of pro-EU politicians in Cyprus. The Greek public was well aware Athens would not be able to repay outstanding debt on anything even vaguely resembling the terms set by the pro-EU politicians. Cognizant of the Cypriot example, they voted their own EU-friendly leaders out, making room for a Euroskeptic administration.

Le souvenir de ce qui est arrivé à Chypre, a joué un rôle dans la montée de Syriza. Ainsi que le comportement collaborationniste des partis pro-euros.

Syriza ran on a platform basically committing to ease austerity in Greece, maintain critical social programs, and radically restructure the country’s debt obligations, insisting that creditors share more of the debt burden. EU-friendly parties and individuals — and the Germans in particular — tended to dismiss Syriza. They were used to dealing with pro-EU parties in debtor countries that would adopt a resistant posture for their public audience while still accepting the basic premise put forth by Germany and the European Union — that in the end, the responsibility to repay debts was the borrower’s. Regardless of their public platform, these parties therefore accepted austerity and the associated social costs.

Les Allemands ne sont pas habitués à traiter avec des partis qui ne sont pas pro- euro. Les partis pro-euro font semblant de protester pour donner le change à leur peuple, mais sur le fond, ils obéissent aux diktats Allemands. Syriza en particulier n ‘a pas joué ce jeu-là. Il a vraiment résisté, il n’a pas fait semblant. Syriza a imposé l’idée que les débiteurs ne sont pas seuls à porter la responsabilité de leurs dettes, mais que les créanciers aussi sont responsables et donc ils doivent partager la responsabilité morale et financière. Les créanciers n’ont pas fait les diligences normales et ils n’auraient pas dû prêter à ceux qui manifestement n’auraient jamais la capacité de rembourser.

Syriza, however, did not. A moral argument was underway, and the Germans were tone deaf to it. The German position on debt was that the borrower was morally responsible for it. Syriza countered that, in effect, the lender and the borrower actually shared moral responsibility. The borrower may be obligated to avoid incurring debts that he could not repay, but the lender, they argued, was also obligated to practice due diligence in not lending money to those who were unable to repay.

Les banques ont été irresponsables en autorisant leur avidité à passer avant les diligences habituelles.

Therefore, though the Greeks had been irresponsible for carelessly borrowing money, the European banks that originally funded Greece’s borrowing spree had also been irresponsible in allowing their greed to overwhelm their due diligence. And if, as the Germans have quietly claimed, Greek borrowers misled them, the Germans still deserved what happened to them, because they did not practice more rigorous oversight — they saw only euro signs, just as the bankers did when they signed off on loans to Greece rather than restraining themselves.

Les Allemands ont manqué à leur devoir de supervision

The story of Greece is a tale of irresponsible borrowing and irresponsible lending. Bankruptcy law in European and American culture is a system of dualities, where expectations for prudent behavior are placed on both the debtor and creditor. The debtor is expected to pay everything he can under the law, and when that is ability is expended, the creditor is effectively held morally responsible for his decision to lend. In other words, when the debtor goes bankrupt, the creditor loses his bet on the debtor, and the loan is extinguished.

L’histoire Grecque est une histoire de prêteurs irresponsables autant qu’une histoire d’emprunteurs irresponsables. Dans la pratique (et dans le passé) quand une dette ne peut être remboursée, le créancier est tenu pour responsable de ses décisions de prêter et quand le débiteur fait faillite, alors le créancier perd sa mise et le prêt est éteint.

But there are no bankruptcy laws for nation-states, because there is no sovereign power to administer them. Thus, there is no disinterested third party to adjudicate national bankruptcy. There are no sovereign laws dictating the point where a nation is unable to repay its debt, no overarching power that can grant them the freedom to restructure debts according to law. Nor are there any circumstances where the creditor is simply deemed out of luck.

En matière internationale pour les Etats-Nations, il n’y a aucune loi qui codifie tout cela et de toute façon aucun pouvoir pour le faire respecter. C’est ainsi donc qu’est née la situation dramatique Grecque. Les créanciers brutalement exigent avant toute chose d’être remboursés. Dans le cas de Chypre le gouvernement pro-euro a choisi de détruire son peuple et son pays et de faire du remboursement la première priorité. Dans le cas Grec, Syriza n’est pas prêt à faire la même chose. Et Syriza n’est pas prête semble-t-il à mentir pour repousser les échéances. Et attendre le grand jour des comptes.

Without these factors, something like the Greek situation emerges. The creditors ruthlessly pursue the debtor, demanding repayment as a first priority. Any restructuring of the debt is at the agreement of creditor and debtor. In the case of Cyprus, the government was prepared to protect the creditors’ interests. But in Greece’s case, Syriza is not prepared to do so. Nor is it prepared, if we believe what the party says, to simply continue crafting interim lies with the country’s creditors. Greece needs to move on from this situation, and another meaningless postponement only postpones the day of reckoning — and postpones recovery.

Le retrait Grec de l’Eurozone  est logique, il faudrait traverser une période difficile, mais ensuite, la Grèce discuterait avec l’Europe dans une meilleure position, sur un pied d’égalité.

A Greek withdrawal from the eurozone would make sense. It would create havoc in Greece for a while, but it would allow the Greeks to negotiate with Europe on equal terms. They would pay Europe back in drachmas priced at what the Greek Central Bank determines, and they could unilaterally determine the payments. The financial markets would be closed to them, but the Greeks would have the power to enact currency controls as well as trade regulations, turning their attention from selling to Europe, for example, to buying from and selling to Russia or the Middle East. This is not a promising future, but neither is the one Greece is heading toward now.

Après la sortie, les Grecs paieraient en Drachmes et la Banque Centrale de Grèce déterminerait elle-même la valeur de ce qu’elle peut payer en fixant la parité de la monnaie. La Grèce instaurerait un contrôle des changes, limitation des mouvements de capitaux et elle fixerait les règles des échanges extérieurs. Elle pourrait réorienter son commerce international.

Many have made a claim that a Greek exit could lead the euro to collapse. This claim seems baffling at first. After all, Greece is a small country, and there is no reason why its actions would have such far-reaching effects on the shared currency. But then we remember Germany’s primordial fear: that Greece could set a precedent for the rest of Europe. This would be impossible if the rest of Europe was doing well, but it is not. Spain, for example, has unemployment figures almost as terrible as Greece’s. Some have pointed out that Spain is now one of the fastest-growing countries in Europe, which would be impressive if growth rates in the rest of Europe weren’t paralyzed. Similarly, Spain’s unemployment rate has fallen — to a mere 23 percent. Those who are still enthused about the European Union take such trivial improvements as proof of a radical shift. I see them as background noise in an ongoing train wreck.

Beaucoup craignent que la Grèce soit contagieuse et donne l’exemple de ce qu’il faut faire à d’autres pays. La Grèce sera un précédent. Même si on fait valoir que l’Espagne se porte mieux, la réalité est que la situation de l’Espagne ne s’améliore que marginalement. Ceux qui disent que les choses s’améliorent  ne sont qu’un petit bruit alors que l’on entend le vacarme assourdissant du déraillement du train européen.

The pain of a Greek default and a withdrawal from the eurozone would be severe. But if others see Greece as a forerunner of events, rather than an exception, they may calculate that the pain of unilateral debt restructuring makes sense and gives Greeks a currency that they can at last manage themselves. The fear is that Greece may depart from the euro, not because of any institutional collapse, but because of a keen awareness that sovereign currencies can benefit nations in pain — which many of Europe’s countries are.

La peine des Grecs sera sévère, mais mais on peut considérer le cas Grec comme non pas une exception, mais une préfiguration de ce qui va se passer. Les souffrances provoquées par une restructuration unilatérale de la dette ont un sens si l’avenir ensuite est meilleur grâce à la souveraineté monétaire retrouvée.

I do appreciate that the European Union was meant to be more than an arena for debtors and creditors. It was to be a moral arena in which the historical agony of European warfare was abolished. But while the idea that European peace depends on prosperity may be true, that prosperity has been lost. Economies rise and fall, and Europe’s have done neither in tandem. Some are big winners, like Germany, and many are losers, to a greater or lesser degree. If the creation of a peaceful European civilization rests on prosperity, as the founding EU document claims, Europe is in trouble.

L’idée européenne que la paix dépend de la prospérité est peut être valable, mais cette prospérité a disparu. Si la création d’une civilisation européenne pacifique repose sur la nécessité de la prospérité, comme le disent les documents fondateurs de l’Europe, alors, l’Europe est en grande difficulté.

The problem is simple. The core institutions of the European Union have functioned not as adjudicators but as collection agents, and the Greeks have learned how ruthless those agents can be when aided by collaborative governments like Cyprus. The rest of the Europeans have also realized as much, which is why Euroskeptic parties are on the rise across the union. Germany, the country most threatened by growing anti-EU sentiment, wants to make clear that debtors face a high price for defiance. And if resistance is confined to Greece, the Germans will have succeeded. But if, as I think it will, resistance spreads to other countries, the revolt of the debtor states against the union will cause major problems for Germany, threatening the economic powerhouse’s relationship with the rest of Europe.

Les institutions européennes ont fonctionné comme agents collecteurs brutaux, agents de recouvrement, les peuples en ont eu la preuve lors de l’affaire de Chypre. Ils ont vu ce que cela donnait lorsque leurs gouvernements étaient complices et collaboraient avec Bruxelles. C’est ce qui explique que les partis eurosceptiques montent. L’Allemagne est menacée par la montée des sentiments anti-EU, c’est elle qui veut que les débiteurs paient le prix fort. Si la résistance reste limitée, confinée à la Grèce, alors l’Allemagne aura gagné, mais si comme c’est probable, elle se répand, les relations de l’Allemagne avec les autres pays, seront en danger.

https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/beyond-greek-impasse